Often Some Sympathy is Expressed. Not This Time.
In the recent case in which the Supreme Court further gutted the Voting Rights Act – Louisiana v. Callais – there was an unusual coldness in their conclusion. There was no attempt to even cover the harm with something like, “The law compels us to rule this way but we wish we could find better results for minority voters”. In rulings where judges are constrained by the law but wish there could be a better conclusion, such expressions, given in some legalese language, are frequent. In this case? Nope. Just, in so many words, you’re out of luck.
My point here is not to reanalyze the whole ruling. You can read about that in many other pieces. I’ll give a brief summary but only to get to how coldly it was delivered.
In the opinion Justice Alito presented in the Callais ruling, he went to great lengths to say that the law, as they were interpreting it, meant minority groups had virtually no recourse. If a state legislature draws voting districts in ways that diluted minority voters, and if the legislators declare any rationale for that, such as they, “aim to protect some or all incumbents” (yes they can protect incumbents regardless if that’s what a fair representation of voters would want) or, “promote the prospects of a particular political party” (yes, the court has declared party-favoritism is allowed regardless that it directly contradicts the idea of representative districts) then that reason has to be believed and the minority groups have no way to challenge that. Actually they can if they can show the legislators are lying and they actually intended to harm minority voting results, but everyone acknowledges that’s almost impossible to prove.
In cases like this where judges feel constrained by how the law is written but are concerned it leaves imperfect justice for some party they can express that in their opinion.
I discussed this aspect with retired Superior Court Judge Ralph Hess (Yavapai County, AZ). He noted that in some of his cases he would directly point out in his order what a party might do. For instance a defendant who must receive what he determined to be an excessively harsh sentence because the law required it, he might issue an order pointing out the defendant’s options for clemency. In other words where he as a judge followed the law but that left some party with what he determined to be incomplete justice he would at least issue an order to address that.
Likewise these very Supreme Court justices have gone out of their way at times to give pointers on how future litigants might achieve different results. Clarence Thomas is one of those who concurred with this gutting of the Voting Rights Act. He, in particular, has something of a pattern of writing a separate opinion in which he points out how he thinks future cases on some issue should be approached. For instance he would like to see regulatory agencies, like the EPA, greatly weakened and has written separate opinions pointing out what legal approach he thinks could achieve that, thereby giving future lawyers pointers on how to possibly succeed.
Alito, in this opinion gutting voting rights, gave none of that. No expression of sympathy, no pointers, no hoping for changes to the law, nothing. None of the other justices who agreed with the opinion wrote any separate opinion to state such concerns either. Alito’s coldness, seemed to suffice for them. Chief Justice Roberts who manages to present a moderate image, but who has advocated for similar extreme positions since long before he was a judge, likewise made no effort to offer concern for these results.
Justice Kagan, in her dissent on Louisiana v. Callais, even quoted just how cold this opinion was. Alito, in legalese that softens the sound of it, basically says that the ability of minority voters to elect their choice comes down to “whatever” results from a legislature doing anything it wants but covering it with any claim of reason other than race (pg 22, end of first paragraph). Justice Kagan, in disagreeing, quotes that and states it more clearly. “Assuming the State has left behind no smoking-gun evidence of a race-based motive [then protecting minority voting rights] will play no role. ‘Whatever’–whatever–results from the State’s asserted justification is all its minority citizens are entitled to. Even if the State has deprived those citizens of all opportunity to ‘elect representatives of their choice,’ the law will not protect them.” (Italics mine.)
Her repulsion at Alito tossing off any chance for minority voters, even in areas where they should have the majority of votes, as “whatever”, so much so that she repeats the word twice, gives a feel for how appalled she is at this callousness.
There is nothing much else to say here. Just that, by their own words, this is who your majority Supreme Court justices are.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT LOUISIANA V. CALLAIS
What did the Supreme Court decide in Louisiana v. Callais? On April 29, 2026, the Court ruled 6–3 that Louisiana’s congressional map was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander and sharply narrowed Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The decision makes it much harder for voters of color to challenge redistricting plans that dilute their voting power.
Who wrote the Callais opinion, and who dissented? Justice Samuel Alito wrote for the six-justice conservative majority. The Court’s three liberal justices dissented, with Justice Elena Kagan writing the principal dissent.
Is Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act still in effect after Callais? Technically yes — the Court did not formally strike it down. But it narrowed the provision so severely that the dissent described it as all but a dead letter for redistricting challenges going forward.
Can minority voters still challenge gerrymandered maps? In principle, but the bar is now extremely high. If a legislature cites a non-racial reason for its map — such as protecting incumbents or favoring a political party — challengers essentially have to produce direct proof of intentional racial discrimination, a “smoking gun” most observers consider nearly impossible to find.
What was the “whatever” line in Kagan’s dissent? Kagan seized on the majority’s framing that, absent smoking-gun proof of racial motive, minority voters are entitled only to “whatever” a legislature’s stated justification happens to produce. She repeated the word to underscore how little protection the ruling leaves in place.
Why is the Callais opinion described as unusually cold? Judges who feel bound by an unwelcome legal outcome often soften it — expressing regret or pointing to other avenues of relief. This piece argues Alito did none of that: no note of sympathy, no roadmap for future litigants, and no concurring justice stepped in to add one.
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